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ABSTRACT 
Rhetorical questions, and other varieties of pragmatically conditioned questions, present 
a challenge for a purely truth-conditional theory of the interpretation of interrogatives. In 
this paper, it is argued that relevance-theoretic principies account for the conditions of use 
of rhetorical questions. Concretely, it is proposed that a pragmatic principie, the "Bottom 
of Scale Principie", critically interacts with the Principie of Relevance and derives the 
dynamic meaning of the rhetorical use of a question. The Bottom of Scale Principie is also 
associated with the particular entailment and monotonicity properties of interrogatives, 
which explain the ability of rhetorical questions to license negative polarity items. 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, the analysis of the linguistic forms of interpersonal communication or 
dialogues has become one of the subjects of most intensive research in semantics and 
pragmatics, from the linguistic, philosophic and computational point of view -see Asher 
(1997) for a summary. Three theories emerged in the eighties that had the analysis of 
discourse and dialogue, in its semantic and pragmatic aspects, as their main focus: Situation 
Semantics (Barwise and Perry, 1983); Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp, 1981);and 
Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986). 
One of the main purposes of relevance theoretic accounts of meaning is to abandon the 
tradicional view of pragmatic content as given by the equation: Pragmatics = meaning -
truth conditional content. The architecture of language cognition put forth by Relevance 
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Theory defends a central contribution of pragmatics to the explicatures (Carston, 1988) of 
linguistic expressions that feed truth-conditíonal interpretation. 
In this general setting, the analysis of speaker/hearer interactions through 
question/answer conversational exchanges offers an ideal ground for the study of the 
división of labor between semantics and pragmatics and. the impact of relevance in 
discourse. In this paper, an analysis of rhetorical questions is presented in which special 
attention is paid to the idiosyncratic properties of the ücensing of negative polarity items in 
these constructions. These properties will be considered central for a proper understanding 
of the semantics and pragmatics of rhetorical questions. Furthermore, it will be argued that 
a complete picture of the meaning of these constructions can only be offered if scalar aspects 
that affect relevance are taken into account. 
The paper is structured as follows: in the second section, rhetorical questions are 
distinguished from information questions and the essentials of a relevance-theoretic 
treatment are presented; in sections three and four, the basic cross-linguistic fects of 
negative polarity licensing in rhetorical questions are presented, several approaches to this 
phenomenon are discussed, and a semantic solution is defended; finally, in section four, the 
initial account of the pragmatics of questions is supplemented with a principie derived from 
scalarity -the Bottom of Scale Principie-- whose interaction with the Principie of Relevance 
explains the conditions of use of rhetorical questions. 
2. Information questions and rhetorical questions 
Consider the following sentence: 
(1) Who cares about Bosnia? 
The interrogative sentence above may be understood as a request for information, what 
in the following will be called an information question. When a speaker s utters (1), s is 
asking the addressee to provide some information that s estimates relevant (Sperber and 
Wilson, 1986). In answerktg (1), the addressee filis a gap in s' knowledge or information 
state. As Bach and Harnish (1979) put it: "Questions are special cases of requests, special 
in that what is requested is that the speaker provide the hearer with certain information". 
Interrogative statements involve a bi-directional interaction between a speaker and a 
hearer/addressee. The consideration of this interaction is central for the study of the 
semantics and pragmatics of questions but is not captured in the most prominent approaches 
to the semantics of questions withinthe model-theoretic paradigm. For Hamblin (1973) and 
Karttunen (1977), a question denotes a set of propositions. The difference between the 
conceptions of these two authors is that for Hamblin an interrogative statement denotes the 
set of its possible answers whereas for Karttunen it denotes the set of its trae answers.! The 
translation of (1) into a formula of the language of intensional logic that implements 
Karttunen's conception would be as follows:2 
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(2) Ap[3x[p = Xare about Bosnia'(x)] A True(p)] 
In a situation in which Bill Clinton and Helmut Kohl care about Bosnia, the above 
formula would denote the following set: 
(3) {"Care about Bosnia'(Helmut Kohl'), 'Care about Bosnia'(Bill Clinton')} 
since these two propositions would be the only true propositions satisfying the condition in 
(2). As becomes clear, Karttunen's theory is agent iudependent, in the sense that it does not 
capture the idea of information flow from speaker to addressee and viceversa. Nothing is 
said about the different possibilities that arise in an information exchange with respect to the 
utterance of (2) or of any of the answers in (3). In addition, the set in (3) represente the 
individual propositions3 that jointly constitute the complete true answer to (2), but are not 
related to the linguistic forra of possible renditions of complete true answers to (2). Wilson 
and Sperber (1988), following Bolinger (1978), raise another objection for the standard 
model-theoretic account. Within Karttunen's conception, the three questions in (4) would 
have the same meaning, since they would denote the same set of propositions, namely the 
set in (5). Nevertheless it seems clear that the sentences below cannot be uttered felicitously 
in the same contexto. 
(4) a. Did you see Susan? 
b. Didn't you see Susan? 
c. Did you or did you not see Susan? 
(5) a. { "See(Susan)(you), * ->See(Susan)(you) } 
Consequently, the truth-conditional approach seems to M to capture not only the conditions 
of use of the above sentences but also their dynamic content or role in a conversation 
exchange, in other words, how uttering each of the sentences in (4) may have different 
repercussions in the information state of the participante in a conversation. 
The class of questions under discussion in this paper, rhetorical questions, represent a 
more direct challenge for a purely semantic account of the meaning of questions. Sentence 
(2) above may express a rhetorical question when associated with a particular intonation 
pattern.4 In that case, the sentence cannot be interpreted as a request for information on the 
part of the addressee but rather as an assertion. Sadock (1971; 1974) claims that rhetorical 
questions have the illocutionary forcé of a strong assertion. More concretely, positive 
rhetorical questions such as the examples in (6) have the illocutionary forcé of a negative 
assertion, as the equivalent declarative statements in (7) ¿Ilústrate. On the other hand, 
negative rhetorical questions, such as the examples in (8), have the illocutionary forcé of 
a positive assertion and are equivalent to the declarative sentences in (9). 
(6) a. Who could be interested in Astronomy these days? 
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b. Who has ever been to Katmandu? 
c. Are you going to pass any exam? 
(7) a. Nobody is interested in Astronomy these days 
b. Nobody has ever been to Katmandu 
c. You are not going to pass any exam 
(8) a. Who couldn't be interested in Astronomy these days? 
b. Who hasn't ever been to New York? 
c. Aren't you going to pass any course you try? 
(9) a. Everybody is interested in Astronomy these days 
b. Everybody has been to New York some time 
c. You are going to pass any course you try 
Sadock (1971; 1974) proposes a series of tests that set rhetorical questions apart from 
information questions. These tests apply equally to yes/no questions and w/z-questions.5 
First, the introductory expression after all can occur with rhetorical questions but cannot 
occur with information questions. For instance, (10) can only be interpreted as a rhetorical 
question. 
(10) After all, are you coming to the party? 
Second, rhetorical questions can be followed by a clause headed by the item yet. This is not 
possible in the case of information questions. 
(11) Did I receive help from anybody? Yet, I managed to complete my tasks on time 
The parenthetical expression by any chance may be used in rhetorical question, but not in 
an information question. The question in (12) tends to be not interpreted as a request for 
information. 
(12) Is John coming, by any chance? 
Finally, if a rhetorical question is used as a parenthetical it can adopt the form of a non-
restrictive relative clause, as illustrated in (13a). On the other hand, information questions 
must adopt the form of a conjunct when used as parentheticals, as the contrast between (13b) 
and (13c) shows. 
(13) a. Symbolic logic, which who cares about anyway, is awfully tough. 
b. Symbolic logic, and by the way who invented it?, isn't my cup of Postum. 
c. *Symbolic logic, which by the way who invented, isn't my cup of Postum. 
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Rhetorical questions, as well as echo questions, quiz questions, exam questions, etc.(Bell, 
1975) nave proven to be elusive for strictly model-theoretic treatments and have become the 
cornerstone of arguments in favor of the superiority of a relevance-theoretic analysis of 
questions (Wilson and Sperber, 1988; Blakemore, 1994). Wilson and Sperber (1988) argüe 
that their distinction between descriptive and interpretive uses (Sperber and Wilson, 1986) 
is essential for the understanding of questions that do not constitute requests for information 
from an illocutionary point of view. Descriptive uses are associated with descriptive 
representations. A representation is descriptive or truth-conditional if and only if what is 
represented is "a relation between thoughts or utterances and states of affairs" (Wilson and 
Sperber, 1988: 87). On the other hand, a representation is interpretive if and only if what 
is represented is "a relation between thoughts or utterances and other thoughts or utterances 
Ihatthey resemble" (op. cit.:87). Whena thought orutterance is used to represent another 
thought or utterance, it is called an interpretive use. 
Wilson and Sperber claim that interrogative utterances are always interpretively used 
and the corresponding representation is what the speaker considers as the relevant answer. 
An interrogative utterance achieves relevance by representing its answer as desirable. The 
semantic variability of questions, in other words, the explanation of why they are not always 
requests for information, comes from the intrinsic indeterminacy of the notion of relevance, 
defmed in terms of cognitive effect. In different contexts6 this indeterminacy may be 
pragmatically resolved as a function of who the speaker thinks would regard the represented 
thought as desirable. In the case of information questions, optimal relevance is achieved in 
the direction of the speaker, in other words the answer is relevant to him in the sense that 
itupdates bis information state in the desired dimensión. In the case of rhetorical questions, 
"the semantic indeterminacy is resolved in the hearer's favor" (Wilson and Sperber, 1988: 
98). The speaker indicates that he regards the answer as relevant to the hearer. 
The above characterization of rhetorical questions supplements the semantic perspective 
with the consideration of a pragmatic dimensión. In rhetorical questions, the speaker 
already knows the answer to the question but calis the hearer's attention to a thought or 
proposition that is being expressed by the question. More specifically, the relevant thought 
is already in the knowledge base or information state of the speaker and the rhetorical 
question makes this fact apparent to the hearer. Consider a situation in which A is telling B 
that he has a tight schedule and he wül not be able to finish the assigned task during the next 
month. B knows that A has reservations for a one week vacation in the Bahamas in fifteen 
days. Then, B utters the following question: 
(14) Aren't you going to the Bahamas? 
The interrogative sentence (14) represents the following proposition: 
(15) You are going to the Bahamas 
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Proposition (15) is not relevant to the speaker B, because this proposition is part of bis 
cognitive information state and just recovering it amounts to little cognitive impact (it is not 
informationally relevant). (15) is relevant for A because he is not aware that the speaker 
knows his vacationplans, so the excuses for not completing the assigned task on time do not 
sound truthful. 
Han (1997) argües that rhetorical questions denote their negative answers. This 
characterization is not sufñcient because it does not allow us to distinguish rhetorical 
questions from negative confirmation questions and tag questions. Negative confirmation 
questions are very similar in their form to rhetorical questions. The interrogative sentence 
(16) can be uttered as a negative confirmation question. In that case, the speaker is assuming 
that Fred is coming to dinner but wants confirmation of this fact from the addressee, who 
presumably has more information in this respect. 
(16) Isn't Fred coming to dinner? 
The confirmation question in (16) would denote, within Han's (1997) account, its negative 
answer, namely the proposition Fred is coming to dinner. This would make it 
indistinguishable from its use as a rhetorical question. (16) would be felicitous as a 
rhetorical question in a situation in which the speaker knows that Fred is coming to dinner 
but wants to make that fact relevant to the hearer. On the other hand, (16) is felicitous as a 
confirmatory question, or as the confirmatory use of a question, in a situation in which the 
speaker is not sure of whether Fred is coming to dinner and wants to confirm his initial 
assumption that he will. The distinction between a rhetorical and a confirmatory use of (16) 
is not truth-conditional, but rather represents a difference in the direction of relevance. In 
confirmation questions, the represented thought or proposition is relevant to the speaker. 
He wants to confirm whether an assumption in his knowledge base is trae or not. In 
contrast, as we have seen above, rhetorical questions represent propositions as desirable for 
the hearer. The represented thought or proposition is held as a presupposition in the 
information state of the speaker. This is why the expressed thought is not relevant to him. 
3. Rhetorical questions and negative polarity licensing 
Rhetorical questions impose strict conditions on the logical form or explicature (Carston, 
1988) of their responses. First, the polarity of the answer is the opposite of the polarity of 
the corresponding question, as illustrated in (6-9) above. This constraint does not seem to 
follow from the pragmatic conditions discussed in the previous section. What I will argüe 
in the following is that the presence of a covert decreasing operator in the logical form of 
the interrogative statement, corresponding to the interrogative illocutionary operator, is 
what triggers the behavior of rhetorical questions with respect to polarity. To show this 
point, a related issue has to be analyzed in more detail: the licensing of negative polarity 
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ítems (NPIs) and the proposals that nave been made in the literature to account for their 
occurrence in rhetorical questions. 
From a descriptive point of view, NPIs are words (any, ever, etc) and phrases of diverse 
categories {a single thing, lift afinger, etc.) that occur or are licensed in a very specific and 
restricted set of environments (Ladusaw, 1979): within the scope of sentential or VP 
negation, within the scope of decreasing quantifiers, as complements of adversative 
predicates, in the protasis of conditionals, in before-clauses and in matrix and embedded 
interrogative sentences. 
Not all NPIs have the same distribution. There are (at least) two different classes that 
I will cali, following Zwarts (1990), weak NPIs and strong NPIs. Expressions such as any, 
anybody, any thing, yet, etc. are weak NPIs. They can occur in the scope of the negation 
operator (17a) or in the argument of any decreasing generalized quantifier (17b, c). 
(17) a. He has not been to Moscow ever. 
b. Nobody has ever been to Moscow. 
c. Fewer fhan fíve students have ever been to Moscow. 
Expressions such as give a damn, at all, in weeks, until, a bit, lift afinger and budge an inch 
impose a stronger requirement on their licensing. They occur in the scope of negation and 
in the argument or c-command domain of generalized quantifier expressions like nobody 
(18a,b), but they do not occur in the c-command domain of generalized quantifier 
expressions l\ke few (A) or not more than three (A), where.4 isany commonnoun(18c,d). 
(18) a. He did not arrive untilfive. 
b. Nobody ate anything at all. 
c. *Few students arrived in weeks. 
d. *Not more than three policemen lifted afinger to help us. 
As an initial generalization, it seems evident that weak and strong NPIs are licensed in 
interrogative sentences. An additional characterizing property of this class of constructions 
is that the presence of an NPI triggers the rhetorical interpretation of the question. The 
occurrence of a strong NPI in a question obligatorily triggers a rhetorical reading, a fact 
already noticed by Borkin (1971) and Lawler (1971): 
(19) a. Who bats an eye when the boss comes around? 
Represented thought: Nobody bats an eye when the boss comes around. 
b. Who has seen Harriet in years? 
Represented thought: Nobody has seen Harriet in years. 
c. Who lifted afinger to help when I needed it? 
Represented thought: Nobody lifted a finger to help when I needed it. 
d. Does John read anything at allí 
Represented thought: John did not read anything at all. 
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e. Did a single person read Barriers? 
Represented thought: Not a single person read Barriers. 
The rhetorical reading is optional in yes/no questions with weak NPIs. In normal 
conditíons, when a speaker is trying to disambiguate the two readings (rhetorical and 
non-rhetorical), he places focal stress on the NPI when the rhetorical reading is the one 
intended (20). There is also a typical intonational contour associated with the rhetorical use 
that completely disambiguates the interpretation of the sentence. In wft-questions with weak 
NPIs we observe the same ambiguity (21) and the intended reading is also prosodically 
resolved. 
(20) a. Does John read anything? 
b. Has anybody ever read Barriers'} 
c. Has Mary ever kissed anybody on the first date? 
(21) a. Who has ever been to Moscow? (ambiguous) 
b. Who did Mary ever kiss on the first date? (rhetorical reading preferred) 
c. Who has ever kissed a girl on the first date? (ambiguous) 
The situation is notuniform cross-linguistically. In Spanish, the presence of an NPI (22) or 
a negative quantifier (23) obligatorily triggers the rhetorical reading (see Bosque, 1980). 
(22) a. ¿Quién da un duro por los bosnios? (only rhetorical) 
who gives a coin for the bosnians 
'Who gives a damn about the bosnians?' 
b. ¿Quién de vosotros ha podido pegar ojo? (only rhetorical) 
who of you has could cióse eye 
' Who was able to sleep at all?' 
c. ¿Cuándo daremos abasto? (only rhetorical) 
when give-us enough 
'When would we be able to handle it?' 
d. ¿Quién ha levantado un dedo para salvarnos? (only rhetorical) 
who has lifted a finger to save-us 
'Who has lifted a finger to save us?' 
(23) a. ¿Ha dicho alguien nada? (only rhetorical) 
has said somebody nothing 
'Has anybody said anything?' (rhetorical) 
b. ¿Qué ha hecho nadie en este departamento recientemente? 
what has done nobody in this department recently 
'What has anybody ever done in this department?' (rhetorical) 
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In Spanish there is no source for ambiguity. The informative counterparts of the 
interrogative sentences in (23) would be as in (24), where an existential quantifier is 
substituted for the negative quantifier. 
¿Ha dicho alguien algo? 
has said somebody something 
'Has anybody said anything?' (information question) 
¿Qué ha publicado alguien en este departamento recientemente? 
what has published somebody in this department recently 
' What have people in this department published recently?' 
The "avoid ambiguity in the syntax" strategy of Spanish, contrasts with the essentially 
prosodic strategy of English where, as mentioned above, focal stress or a specific 
intonational contour disambiguate questions with weak NPIs. We have two additional facts 
that confirm the hypothesis proposed for Spanish. First, the presence of the adverb acaso 
'by-any-chance' activates the rhetorical reading of the question when there are no NPIs in 
the sentence, as predicted by the third of Sadock's tests. This adverb can only occur in 
yes/no questions, as the contrast in (25) shows. Second, whereas the NP algún libro 'some 
book' is a positive polarity item (26a), the NP libro alguno 'book some' is an NPI. Henee, 
only the latter triggers a rhetorical reading (26b). 
(25) a. ¿Ha dicho alguien algo acaso? (rhetorical) 
has said somebody something by-any-chance 
'Has anybody said anythúig?' 
b. *¿Qué ha publicado alguien en este departamento acaso? 
what has pubüshed somebody in this department by-any-chance 
(26) a. ¿Ha visto Pedro algún extraterrestre? 
has seen Pedro some extraterrestrial 
'Has Pedro seen any extraterrestrial?' (non-rhetorical) 
b. ¿Ha visto Pedro extraterrestre alguno? 
has seen Pedro extraterrestrial some 
'Has Pedro seen any extraterrestrial?' (rhetorical) 
In Catalán and Italian, NPIs are licensed in yes/no questions (Zanuttini, 1991; Progovac, 
1994). This is also the case of Hindi, according to Lahiri (1995).7 In other languages like 
Chinese, w/z-words can also actas negative polarity items. Huang (1982: 108) presents the 
following inventory: shei 'who/anybody', sheme 'what/anything', na 'which/any', heshi 
'when/ anytime', nali 'where/any place', zeme 'how/any way', weisheme 'why/any 
reason'. The sentences in (27), according to Zhang (1991), are ambiguous between the 
interpretation (I) and (ii). Serbo-Croatian displays a similar behavior, as the example in 
(28),takenfrom 
(24) a. 
b. 
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Progovac (1994), illustrates. 
(27) a. Shei zhidao? 
who know 
(I) 'Whoknows?' or(ii) 'Whoknows?' (rhetorical) = 'Idon't know' 
b. Shei da ren le? 
who hit person ASP 
(I) 'Who hit someone?' or (ii) 'Who hit anyone?' (rhetorical) = 'I didn't hit 
anyone' 
(28) Da li je Milán (I-)sta doñeo? 
that Q has Milán any-what brought 
'Has Milán brought anything?' 
4. Syntactic, semantic and pragmatic accounts 
The range of cross-linguistic variation that we have presented suggests that there are two 
different issues that should receive an independent answer: (I) why are NPIs licensed in 
interrogative sentences? and (ii) where does the rhetorical reading come from? Issue (ii) has 
been partly addressed in the previous section and will also be the main topic of section five 
below. Issue (I), which logically precedes issue (ii), is the main topic of this section. 
Ladusaw (1979) proposes a general explanation for the licensing of negative polarity 
items, following Fauconnier's (1975) theory of scalarity: NPIs are licensing when they occur 
in the scope of a decreasing operator. We say that an operator is decreasing if and only if the 
following holds: 
(29) For all A, B of type a such that A < B, where < represents an ordering relation on 
expressions of type a, Op(B) < Op(A) 
Negation is a decreasing operator, and this explains why NPIs are licensed within its scope. 
Surprisingly, Ladusaw's explanation of the occurrence of polarity sensitive items in questions 
is not directly based on decreasingness but rather in a pragmatic principie relating form and 
meaning: 
(30) S[peaker] should pose the question q only when he believes it to be possible for 
H[earer] to express its denotation set without major revisión of the form of the 
question. 
Thus, when a speaker asks a question like (31a), he is expecting that the hearer is going to 
express the answer in a form that does not change the form of the question. Obviously, since 
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the interrogative sentence contains an NPI, the only possible declarative response will be one 
containing a negation (31b). 
(31) a. Did John ever lift a finger to help? 
b. No, he didn't ever lift a finger to help. 
Ladusaw's theory predicts that the only possible reading of sentence (31a) is the rhetorical one. 
Krifka (1991) observes that Ladusaw's account leaves nnexplained why NPIs can also occur 
in neutral or information questions, as illustrated in (20,21) above. The principie in (30) also 
poses conditions on the expressiveness of rhetorical questions which are stricter than 
necessary. Sentence (32a) can be uttered by a speaker s as a rhetorical question. According 
to principie (30), he would expect (32b) as the answer to the rhetorical question, because this 
is the declarative sentence whose form would constitute the least revisión of the form of the 
question. But the speaker's expectations are the opposite, since the relevant proposition 
expressed by the question is that he did not come. 
(32) a. Did he come? 
b. Yes, he carne. 
Progovac's (1994) theory attempts to give an explanation of NPI licensing based primarüy on 
the syntactic constraints of binding theory within a Government and Binding model of syntax. 
Por the cases in which NPIs occur in non-overtly negative environments, such as conditionals 
and questions, she proposes that there is a nuil operator that binds the NPI. NPIs licensed by 
an element other than clausemate negation have to raise at LE Horn and Lee (1995) observe 
that her analysis wrongly predicts that strong NPIs like budge an indi or lift a finger are 
licensed only by clausemate negation since they are not Qpsa nd cannot raise at LE 
Therefore, Progovac's analysis does not explain why idiomatic strong NPIs occur in 
questions. Second, with respect to the rhetorical reading, she states that "in order to derive 
rhetorical forcé in w/z-questions it is enough to assume that wh-AGR and Op in Comp are 
incompatible, both requiring a sepárate interpretation in the Comp position ... The only 
remaining option is to suppress wh-AGR in Comp, resulting in the loss of the w/z-force ... 
Since only negated NPIs are tolerated in the Spec of CP, the operator in Comp must set its 
switch to the negative valué, and due to Spec/Head AGR, the w/z-word gets interpreted as a 
negated NPI." (Progovac, 1994: 98-99) 
Tiiere are several problems for this line of explanation. First, wh-woids in questions with 
NPIs display full agreement (overtly realized and semantically relevant). Second, the rhetorical 
interpretation of a question is sometimes optional, namely when weak NPIs occur in it as in 
(20) and (21). Progovac's theory wrongly predicts that the presence of an NPI automatically 
triggers the "loss of the wh-force". Finally, no distinctions are made among NPIs. 
Krifka's (1991) theory posits a combination of semantic and pragmatic iactors for the 
licensing of NPIs in different constructions. Specifically he defends that "the pragmatic setting 
of asking questions" has to be examined more closely if rhetorical readings are to be accounted 
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for. On the semantic side, he preseras a Iattice-theoretical approach to NPIs. He introduces the 
concept of a polarity lattice defined as a triple LA = <a ' , LA, <a>, where a' is the NPI 
representation, LA is the lattice sort and the following conditions hold: (a) if a' is of type a, LA 
is of type <cr,t> (b) <a is a preorder relation on LA, (c) a' 6 LA, and LA contains at least one more 
element, and (d) a' is the unique Y such that for every X e LA, Y <a X. For example, the polarity 
lattice of the NPI a drop ofwine is <a.drof.of.wine', Ladrop.ofwbli:, <a.drop.of.winc> where for all 
properties X, if X e LÍÓIor¡Mní, then X is the property of being a quantity ofwine of a certain size 
and a.drop.of.wine' is the least element of the lattice (i.e. Vx[a.drop.of.wine'(x) -* wine'(x) A 
x is smaller than some quantity s]). The process of question formation consists in attaching the 
illocutionary operator ERO to the sentence radical. If p' is a proposition, / a world, .v the speaker, 
and h the hearer, then ERO(s,h,i,p') says thatí asks h whether/»' is true at the world i. In the case 
of rhetorical questions, Krifka claims that the speaker wants to show that he is sure to get a 
negative answer, so he follows the rule: 
(33) If ERO(s,h,i,A') and a'is an NPI or PPI representation with lattice sort LA, then for any 
X e LA with X T¿ a', s has reasons for ^ERO(s,h,i,X). 
Consider the following interrogative sentence: 
(34) Did you ever drink a drop ofwine? 
According to the rule, rf a speaker s asks question (34), then for any property X in the polarity 
lattice L^ jrop.oc,™,,, s has reasons for not asking whether a proposition containing X is true at /. The 
speaker asks a question only about the least element in the lattice, namely a.drop.of.wine'. From 
the point of view of the discussion of the pragmatics of rhetorical questions in section two, it is 
not clear whether the above rule captures the essence of what is a rhetorical question. The 
speaker is not even asking whether the proposition p containing the least element in the relevant 
polarity lattice is true. He already knows what the answer is and he is asking it for reasons 
different than knowing whether p is true in /. The question is uttered not as a request for 
information, but with other communicative purpose: to make the hearer aware of the relevance 
of/;. In that respect, it seems reasonable to claim that in uttering a rhetorical question, for all X 
e LA the speakers has reasons for ~ERO(s,h,i,X). But even this modification would not yield a 
correct analysis. Rhetorical questions must be treated as questions from the illocutionary point 
of view, although they are obviously not requests for information. Krifka does not deal with the 
issue of what is the specific property of questions that allows the licensing of NPIs either. Finally, 
none of the rules he proposes predict the licensing of NPIs and rhetorical interpretations in 
constituent questions. 
Here, I wül argüe, following Gutiérrez-Rexach (1996), that the semantic property that 
explains the occurrence of NPIs in questions is decreasingness, along the lines of Ladusaw's 
(1979) proposal for negative contexts in general. No additional assumptions are needed. The 
question operator ? that transforms a declarative statement <p into a question ?<p is decreasing 
and questions are decreasing contexts. In order to determine the monotonicity properties of the 
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interrogative operator, fírst it has to be determined what kind of entailment relation arises in the 
interrogative domain. In this point I will follow Groenendijk and Stokhofs (1989) notion of 
entailment in the interrogative domain. They define the (propositional) entailment relation 
between interrogatives as follows: 
(35) An interrogative <p entails an interrogative ifr iff, whenever a proposition gives a 
complete and true answer to <p, it gives such an answer to \¡i. 
Consider now the following examples: 
(36) a. Which guests smoked? 
b. Which guests smoked cigars? 
There is a natural information-based relation between (36a) and (36b) above. In Groenendijk and 
Stokhofs terms, if proposition gives a complete true answer to (36a) it also gives a complete true 
answer to (36b). For instance, in a situation in which John and Fred smoked cigars and Bill 
smoked cigarettes, proposition (37a), expressed by sentence (37b), gives a complete true answer 
to (36a) and it also contains a complete true answer to (36b). 
(37) a A[Smoke'(cigars')(John') A Smoke'(cigars')(Fred') A Smoke'(rigarettes')(BiH')] 
b. John and Fred smoked cigars and Bill smoked cigarettes 
The presence of the interrogative operator makes a question decreasing. If a proposition/» entails 
a proposition q, then ?q entails ?p. The proposition expressed by (38a) entails the proposition 
expressed by (38b). Then, it follows that a question representing (38b) will entail a question 
representing (38a). This is indeed the case, since (36a), the question whose corresponding 
answer would be (38b), entails question (36b), whose corresponding answer is (38a), as 
explained before. 
(38) a. John and Bill smoke cigars 
b. John and Bill smoke 
The generalization that we arrive at is the following: attaching the question formation operator 
? to a proposition/), transforms it into a question ?p. The proposition then becomes a decreasing 
environment and, as a straightforward corollary of Ladusaw's generalization, NPIs are licensed.8 
5. Scalarity and relevance 
Once the licensing of NPIs in questions in general has been accounted for, the problem now 
becomes to explain what pragmatic strategy is served by the systematic use of NPIs, specially 
strong NPIs, in rhetorical questions. It is important to realize that the previously offered 
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explanation of the general mechanisms of NPI licensing, or any of the alternatives discussed, 
does not deal with this part of the meaning of rhetorical questions, related to their conditions of 
use. As pointed out above, only Krifka (1991) realizes that a complete account of the meaning 
of rhetorical questions requires a consideration of their pragmatics. a relevance-theoretic account 
does not suffer from the problems of an strictly illocutionary treatment, such as Krifka's, but 
needs additional developments to incorpórate the effects associated to scalarity, something not 
mentioned by either Sperber and Wilson (1986) or Wilson and Sperber (1998). 
According to Hom (1969) and Fauconnier (1975), pragmatic scales are orderings of lexical 
items associated to certain pragmatic effects, typically triggered by the elements at the top or at 
the bottom of the scale. As observed by Krifka (1991), NPIs can be considered members of 
contextually determined scales. For mstance, the NPI lifi afinger is a member of pragmatic scale 
having as its members VP denotations, more concretely actions. Those actions are ordered with 
respect to a contextually determined criterion. Crucially, NPIs obey the following constraint: 
(39) Bottom of Scale Principie: strong NPIs always denote elements at the bottom of the 
contextually associated scale. WeakNPIs may also denote bottom of scale elements.9 
In the sentence below, the presence of the NPI lifi afinger brings in the entailment that John did 
not perform even the minimal action necessary to help Bill. The relevant ordering of the scale 
is determined by a criterion of effort or willingness ~how much effort or willingness is required 
by a certain action. Obviously, the action of liñing a finger is at the bottom of that scale, so the 
desired entailment is brought about straightforwardly. 
(40) John didn't hft a finger to help Bill 
Consider now the question in (41). From the Bottom of Scale Principie, it follows that the 
presence of the NPI lifi afinger in (41) triggers an associated context C formed by an ordered 
set of VP denotations in which lifi afinger is the bottom element. The intended ordering criterion 
is the same: actions are ordered with respect to the criterion of willingness/effort and the action 
of lifting a finger represent the least effort or involves the least willingness on the part of the 
agent. 
(41) Did John lifi. afinger to save us? 
The thought represented by the rhetorical use of the question above is the following: 
(42) John did not lift a finger to save us. 
Furthermore, it is not possible to utter (41) as a non-rhetorical or information question. Why is 
this so? Because the presence of the NPI is obligatorily associated with the contextually ordered 
scale and, from principie (39), the only thought that the hearer can infer, according to the 
Principie of Relevance, is that the action performed by John was at the bottom of a scale formed 
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by a set of actions (VP denotations). Under normal conditions, the hearer will infer that John did 
little or nothmg to help the individuáis mentioned in (41). Supplementing the relevance-theoretic 
explanation of the rhetorical use of questions with the standard principies communicatively 
related to pragmatic scales is, thus, necessary to explain why questions with strong NPIs, those 
that are obligatorily associated to the bottom of a scale, obligatonly trigger the rhetorical 
ínterpretation of a question. The desired interpretation arises as a consequence of the interaction 
between the Principie of Relevance and the Bottom of Scale Principie. 
Summanzing, when a speaker utters a question and uses an NPI as part of that question, he 
is maximizing the cognitive impact of the question and he is easing the construal of that question 
as relevant to the hearer, ie. as a rhetorical question. 
Notes 
1. See Groenendijk and Stokhof (1996) for an complete and incisive evaluation of the various 
approaches to the semantics of interrogatives. 
2. Formula (2) denotes the set of true propositions p of the form Care about Bosnia'(x), 
where x is an individual variable. 
3. With this term I refer to propositions about individuáis in a models, ie. propositions of the 
form 'P'(a') where P' is a predícate constant and a' is an individual constant (a proper ñame) 
or a variable. 
4. See Escandell (1996) for a relevance-theoretic study of the pragmatics of intonation in 
questions. 
5. Sadock proposes these tests to distinguish rhetorical yes/no questions from information 
seeking yes/no questions. Nevertheless, as the examples proposed here show, the test also apply 
to w/z-questions. 
6. The context of a propositions is a set of propositions C. The contextual implications of 
p are those entailments of the unión of C and p (Sperber and Wilson, 1986). 
7. Although Lahiri (p.c.) admits that NPIs are also licensed in constituent questions, 
obligatorily triggering the rhetorical reading. 
8. The study of the monotonicity properties of w/z-questions requires a more careful 
consideration of the monotonicity properties of interrogative quantifiers, as done in Gutierrez-
Rexach (1997). 
9. The exceptionality of weak NPIs can be explained as a by-product of their widening 
behavior (Kadmon and Landman, 1993). 
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